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Thomas Immanuel Steinberg

Die Zerschlagung Afghanistans heißt jetzt Regionalisierung

Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg erhärtet einen lang gehegten Verdacht

Seit 2006 weist SteinbergRecherche darauf hin, daß die Kriege des Westens  im Nahen Osten und in Mittelasien auf die Zerschlagung der Staaten der Region zielen könnten, und was speziell den Irak anlangt, seit 2004.

Verteidigungsminister zu Guttenberg hat mit seiner Rede vom 19. November 2009 im Center for Strategic and International Studies, Video und Transkript, den Verdacht erhärtet. Er will Afghanistan regionalisieren. Unter Verwendung eines Beitrags von Ulrich Rippert bei WSWS kommentiert Mike Whitney vom Information Clearing House:

During his inaugural visit to Washington, new German defense secretary, Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg said it was necessary to put aside “the romantic idea of democratization of the whole country along the lines of the western model” and instead “transfer control of individual provinces step by step to the Afghan security forces.”

The new strategy of “regionalization” is aimed at dividing Afghanistan into individual cantons—in a similar manner to what took place in Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia. Up to now the US-NATO occupation supported the government of Hamid Karzai and sold the process to the public as “democratization”. However, occupation forces are moving increasingly to hand over power directly to regional warlords and their militias—on the assumption that such regional forces will follow the orders of their imperial masters. As soon as there is no more danger in a specific province, Guttenberg declared, then the international troops should be withdrawn from that area."

Whitney sagt eine ethnische Säuberung des afghanischen Nordens von den Paschtunen voraus:

In the years ahead, we can expect to see relief and reconstruction efforts stepped up to provide security in the heavily-populated areas while the war in the south is expanded and intensified. Tajiks and Uzbeks, in the Afghan military will be enlisted to fight or expel their Pashtun countrymen, while warlords, druglords and human rights abusers are handed over large swathes of the countryside. 30,000 more troops is not enough to lock-down all of Afghanistan, but it may be enough to force hundreds of thousands of people into regional bantustans where they can be controlled by bloodthirsty chieftains, the very same men who leveled Kabul on April 28, 1992, killing 80,000 Afghan civilians. This is Obama's plan for Afghanistan, a carbon-copy of George Bush's.

Tadschiken und Usbeken siedeln überwiegend im afghanischen Norden, siehe Karte. Dort hat auch die Bundeswehr ihre Kriegsfahnen aufgesteckt, siehe Karte.

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Hier die einschlägigen Passagen aus zu Guttenbergs Auftritt, .pdf-Datei (Hervorhebungen von T:I:S):

… What is now still exceptional – German military deployments – needs to become more common and needs to become thus more widely accepted, and this was one of the reasons why I, to the surprise of some in Germany, tried to find a new language a couple of weeks ago when it came to the explanation and the descriptions for our military deployments, to find a language which is blunt, which is clear and which tries to describe what I think is reality.

And we have had a tendency in German politics all over the party lines to somehow – let’s call it euphemistically, outbalance our language when it came, for instance, to Afghanistan and what we are doing there and why we are doing it and what’s actually happening there. And some were startled and very surprised that the term war or that the term, actually, the term war suddenly played a role in public discussion on Germany. But I think it is necessary that we lead that discussion and it’s necessary that we also keep in mind what reactions that may cause may be on the legal level – it’s a soft discussion we are having – and may be on the emotional level.

For decades, the risk to the safety of our country has been so very real for us Germany, tangible most, that the change towards the risk management of today’s security policy is not easy. We are faced with new and increasingly complex threats and challenges. We have discussed them very often also at CSIS, and in today’s security environment – and this is a truism – threats no longer respect borders or geographical distances...

But this is not all. Analysis of future trends, such as the 2008 National Intelligence Council study, indicate that the West is faced with a relative decline in power. For Europe, things look even gloomier. It is said to lose much of its influence and current status. What a lovely prospective, ladies and gentlemen. On the other hand, new powers emerge – China and India are just two of them. In recent years, we have allowed the transatlantic partnership and NATO, its most important forum, to drift – at least to a certain extent.

And there’s quite some discussion going on right now in Germany whether the transatlantic partnership and the transatlantic ties still have the same or even higher relevance than, for instance, the transpacific ties, ladies and gentlemen. I’m not referring to a trip that is taking place right now, definitely not. But we all have to be aware that this – that at least this – those ties are getting stronger. And from a European, from a German perspective, we not only need to discuss it but also see it as a reason to foster and strengthen the transatlantic ties. Not to follow them only with romantic or nostalgic views and tear-driven eyes.

In Europe, during the last couple of years, as you all have followed, to a certain extent, anti-Americanism grew – accusing the U.S. of being responsible for many crises around the world, of doing too much, of not doing enough, or of not doing it right…

It is the first operation that followed an attack on one of the alliance members. For NATO, this mission is unprecedented in scope, in breadth and complexity both in civil and the military terms. And this is why visiting Afghanistan was priority to me. And I wanted to gain another first hand insight and talk to various actors involved. There are countless pictures of Kabul and Kunduz in my mind now – pictures of a difficult situation for both our soldiers and the Afghan people. And, to be very honest, Kabul at the moment is more fortress than a lively village or city.

And our soldiers are in combat, unfortunately; far from stabilization…

I underline the word, clear aim and, clear benchmarks, and not just phrases and not just vague impressions, but benchmarks that deserve the name because we have to struggle in Germany, as in many other countries and partner nations as well, with the inflationary use of the term “exit strategy.”

And the question is how we use the word “exit strategy” or whether we use it? Is exit strategy just off and away or does it actually mean handover in responsibility? And does it then follow a clear structure and does it follow a clear strategy as such? …

Conflict resolution in Afghanistan cannot be done with military means only. What an unbelievably boring sentence but how unbelievably true. Hence, besides formulating a clear strategy for success, we need to agree on a pragmatic and binding work-share. Every actor involved, at the national as well as international level, needs to perform and show full commitment. And I clearly underline, very positively, what I hear over here and what I’ve heard from Gen. McChrystal last week in Kabul that the term, regionalization, is gaining more and more grounds. And that the regional aspects of the forthcoming, hopefully, of the forthcoming strategy are playing a significant role. And this is the experience we have had within our comprehensive approach that this might be, maybe, key for any access…

On the caveats and the complaints, to be very honest, I had frank and very open talks during the last couple of weeks with responsible – specifically – gentlemen in Kabul, with those having responsibility for ISAF and for other things. And I haven’t heard the complaints any longer we have heard for a while. And that is because – I think because we have made clear that the German soldiers are not any longer in the North only to dig holes for water and to wave to Afghan children.

It’s more and more that we are also in combat situations

On McChrystal’s concept, I clearly understand his concept, not only as one that focuses on numbers of troops, but that gives also an indication that there is much more to cover. And this is why I work on, specifically, the civilian means he’s offering in his concept.

And I am very much in favor of the clear perspective on regional topics and regional ties he wants to build and build up

T:I:S, 6. Dezember 2009. Siehe auch: Guttenberg redet in Washington Klartext. msn Nachrichen vom 20. November 2009

URL dieses Beitrags: http://www.steinbergrecherche.com/09mittelasien.htm#Guttenberg 

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